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Convex Optimization Based State Estimation against Sparse Integrity Attacks
Duo Han∗, Yilin Mo∗ and Lihua Xie∗
Abstract— We consider the problem of robust estimation
in the presence of integrity attacks. There are m sensors
monitoring the state and p of them are under attack. The
malicious measurements collected by the compromised sensors
can be manipulated arbitrarily by the attacker. The classical
estimators such as the least squares estimator may not provide
a reliable estimate under the so-called (p,m)-sparse attack.
In this work, we are not restricting our efforts in studying
whether any specific estimator is resilient to the attack or
not, but instead we aim to present some generic sufficient and
necessary conditions for robustness by considering a general
class of convex optimization based estimators. The sufficient
and necessary conditions are shown to be tight, with a trivial
gap.
I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of networks has been increasingly prevailing
for decades, e.g., computer networks, sensor networks or
social networks. Regardless of numerous benefits introduced
by bridging machines or humans through networks, the inter-
connect and distributed nature renders networks vulnerable
to various kinds of attacks, ranging from physical attacks to
internet viruses to groundless rumors through online social
networks. This article is concerned with the integrity attacks
in sensor networks which are widely embedded in various
industrial systems such as smart grid [1] or Supervisory
Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems [2]. During
the integrity attack, the adversary can take full control of a
subset of sensors and arbitrarily manipulate their measure-
ments. The motivations for launching such an attack in indus-
trial systems may include creating arbitrage opportunities in
electricity market, stealing gas or oil without being noticed,
posing potential threat to national defense, etc. Since the first
SCADA system malware (called Stuxnet) was discovered and
extensively investigated [3], [4], increasing research attention
has been paid to resolve the security issues in estimation and
control systems [5].
In this article, we focus on the problem of robust estima-
tion against compromised sensory data in order to mitigate
the damage caused by the integrity attack. Robustness for
an estimator is urgently needed since quite a number of
the commonly used estimators under attack fail to give a
reliable estimate and thus lead to poor system performance.
For instance, a linear estimator is not robust since one
bad measurement is enough to ruin the final estimate. A
better estimator may be the geometric median of all mea-
surements [6]. To be concrete, we consider the problem
of estimating a vector state x ∈ Rn from measurements
collected by m sensors, where the measurements are subject
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to any random noise. For practical reasons, the spatially
distributed sensors cannot be fully guaranteed to be secure.
Some of them may be controlled by the attacker and due
to the resource limitation the attacker can only attack up
to p < m sensors. Without posing any restrictions on the
attacker, we assume that the compromised sensory data can
be arbitrarily changed.
Related Work: A quite similar problem in the context of
power systems is bad data detection, which has been studied
over the past decades [7], [8]. The method of checking the
magnitude of residue is useful for identifying random bad
data or outliers but may not work for intentional integrity
attacks [9], [10]. For example, Liu et al. [11] successfully
showed that a stealthy attack changing the state while not
being detected is possible. Kim et al. [12] studied a so-called
framing attack. Under such a attack, the bad data detector is
misled to delete those critical measurements, without which
the network is unobservable and a convert attack may be
launched.
For dynamical systems, detecting malicious components
via fault detection and isolation based methods has also been
extensively studied, [13]–[17]. However, in most of these
works, the system is assumed to be noiseless, which greatly
favors the failure detector. Pajic et al. [18] improved the work
by considering the systems with bounded noise. On the top
of sufficient conditions for exact recovery in noiseless case,
they showed that the worst error is still bounded even under
attack. However, their estimator is based on a combinatorial
optimization problem, which in general is computational
hard to solve and may not be applicable for large scale sys-
tems. In [19], [20], the authors use reachability analysis and
ellipsoid approximation to characterize all possible biases the
adversary can inject to the system.
In the area of statistics, the concept of robust estimators
is not new [21]–[23]. The robustness is often measured by
breakdown points [24], [25] or influence functions [26].
Many existing works studied one or several estimators and
discussed the breakdown point properties [27]–[30]. How-
ever, a unified analysis for most useful estimators is still
absent.
Motivated by different behaviors of various estimators
under the integrity attacks, we manage to provide a unified
robustness analysis framework integrating most commonly
used estimators. To reach this goal, we first give a formal def-
inition on the robustness of an estimator. To achieve greater
generality, a general convex optimization based estimator
is proposed and necessary and sufficient conditions on the
robustness of such an estimator is proved. The significance
of this work is that the analytical results presented in this
manuscript can be used for characterizing and designing a
robust estimator in the presence of compromised sensory
data.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section
II we formulate the robust estimation problem. Our main
results on the robustness of a general convex optimization
based estimator is presented in Section III. The concluding
remarks are given in Section IV.
II. PROBLEM SETUP
A. System Model
Assume that m sensors are measuring the state x and the
measurement equation for the ith sensor is given by
zi = Hix+ wi, (1)
where x ∈ Rn is the state of interest, zi ∈ Rmi is the “true”
measurement collected by the ith sensor, and wi ∈ Rmi is
the measurement noise for the ith sensor. The measurement
matrix H , [H⊤1 , H⊤2 , . . . , H⊤i ]⊤ ∈ R(
∑
i
mi)×n is assumed
to be observable, i.e., H is full column rank. In the presence
of attacks, the measurement equation can be written as
yi = zi + ai = Hix+ wi + ai, (2)
where yi ∈ Rmi is the “manipulated” measurement and ai ∈
Rmi is the attack vector. In other words, the attacker can
change the measurement of the ith sensor by ai. Denote
z , [z⊤1 , z
⊤
2 , . . . , z
⊤
m]
⊤, y , [y⊤1 , y
⊤
2 , . . . , y
⊤
m]
⊤, (3)
w , [w⊤1 , w
⊤
2 , . . . , w
⊤
m]
⊤, a , [a⊤1 , a
⊤
2 , . . . , a
⊤
m]
⊤.
Denote the index set of all sensors as S , {1, 2, . . . ,m}.
For any index set I ⊆ S, define the complement set to be
Ic , S\I. In our attack model, we assume that the attacker
can only compromise at most p sensors but can arbitrarily
choose ai. Formally, a (p,m)-sparse attack can be defined
as
Definition 1 ((p,m)-sparse attack): A vector a is called a
(p,m)-sparse attack if there exists an index set I ⊂ S, such
that:
(i) ‖ai‖ = 0, ∀i ∈ Ic;
(ii) |I| ≤ p.
Define the collection of a possible index set of malicious
sensors as
C , {I : I ⊂ S, |I| = p}.
The set of all possible (p,m)-sparse attacks is denoted as
A ,
⋃
I∈C
{a : ‖ai‖ = 0, i ∈ I
c}.
The main task of this work is to investigate the generic
sufficient and necessary conditions for an estimator to be
robust to (p,m)-sparse attacks. To this end, we first formally
define the robustness of an estimator.
Definition 2 (Robustness): An estimator g : R∑i mi 7→
Rn which maps the measurements y to a state estimate xˆ is
said to be robust to the (p,m)-sparse attack if it satisfies the
following condition:
‖g(z)− g(z + a)‖ ≤ µ(z), ∀a ∈ A, (4)
where µ : R
∑
i
mi 7→ R is a real-valued mapping on z.
The robustness implies that the disturbance on the state
estimate caused by an arbitrary attack is bounded. A trivial
robust estimator is g(y) = 0 which provides very poor esti-
mate. Therefore, another desirable property for an estimator
is translation invariance, which is defined as follows:
Definition 3 (Translation invariance): An estimator g is
translation invariant if g(z +Hu) = u+ g(z), ∀u ∈ Rn.
Remark 1: Notice that if an estimator is robust and trans-
lation invariant, then
‖g(z)− g(z + a)‖ = ‖x+ g(w) − x+ g(w + a)‖
= ‖g(w)− g(w + a)‖ ≤ µ(w).
Therefore, the maximum bias that can be injected by an
adversary is only a function of the noise w.
In the next subsection, we propose a general convex opti-
mization based estimator which is translation invariant.
B. A General Estimator
A large variety of estimators are developed by the research
community to solve the state estimation problem. In order
to achieve greater generality, we first propose a general
convex optimization based estimator. We then show that
many estimators can be rewritten in this general framework.
The estimator that we study in this paper is assumed to
have the following form:
xˆ = g(y) , arg min
xˆ
∑
i∈S
fi(yi −Hixˆ), (5)
where the following properties of function fi : Rmi 7→ R
are assumed:
(i) fi is convex.
(ii) fi is symmetric, i.e., fi(u) = fi(−u).
(iii) fi is non-negative and fi(0) = 0.
Remark 2: It is easy to check that the estimator g is
translation invariant. One can view yi −Hixˆ as the residue
for the ith sensor and fi as a cost function. The convex
constraints on fi ensures that the minimization problem can
be solved in an efficient (possibly also distributed) way.
The symmetric assumption on fi is typically true for many
practically used estimator and can actually be relaxed. The
last assumption implies that the cost achieves minimum value
when the residue is 0.
We now investigate several commonly used estimator and
show that they can be written as (5).
(a) Least Square Estimator:
xˆ = arg min
xˆ
‖y −Hxˆ‖
2
2 = arg min
xˆ
∑
i∈S
‖yi −Hixˆ‖
2
2
= (H⊤H)−1H⊤y. (6)
(b) Another example is an estimator which minimizes the
sum of the l1 norm of the residue, i.e.,
xˆ = arg min
xˆ
∑
i∈S
‖yi −Hixˆ‖1 . (7)
In the case that mi = n and Hi = In, ∀i, the estimate
is a vector in which the ith entry is the median over the
ith entries of all measurements yi’s.
(c) The following is designed to minimize the sum of the l2
norm of the residue:
xˆ = arg min
xˆ
∑
i∈S
‖yi −Hixˆ‖2 . (8)
The optimal estimate in the case that mi = n and Hi =
In, ∀i is the geometric median of all yi’s, which is called
an L1 estimator in [6]. In other words, xˆ is the point in
Rn that minimizes the sum of Euclidean distances from
yi to that point.
(d) Pajic et al. [18] proposed the following robust estimator
in the presence of integrity attack:
minimize
xˆ,a,w
‖w‖2
subject to y = Hxˆ+ w + a, ‖a‖0 ≤ q.
However, the minimization problem involves zero-norm,
and thus is difficult to solve in general. A commonly
adopted approach is to use L1 relaxation to approximate
zero-norm, which leads to the following minimization
problem:
minimize
xˆ,a,w
‖w‖2 + λ‖a‖1 (9)
subject to y = Hxˆ+ w + a.
If we define the following function:
d(u) , minimize
ai
‖u− ai‖
2
2 + λ ‖ai‖1 (10)
Then one can easily prove that the optimization problem
(9) can be rewritten as
xˆ = arg min
xˆ
∑
i∈S
d(yi −Hixˆ). (11)
In the next section, we shall present sufficient and neces-
sary conditions for the robustness of the general estimator
(5). Since (7), (8) and (11) are all special cases of (5), we
can easily analyze their individual robustness.
III. ROBUST ANALYSIS FOR A GENERAL ESTIMATOR
This section is devoted to the derivation of necessary
and sufficient conditions for the robustness of the general
estimator. Denote the compact set U , {u ∈ Rn : ‖u‖ = 1}.
Before proceeding to the main results, we need the following
lemma.
Lemma 1: Let q : R → R be a convex function and
q(0) = 0, then q(t)/t is monotonically non-decreasing on
t ∈ R+. Moreover,
q(t+ 1)− q(t) ≥ q(t)/t. (12)
Proof: For any 0 < α < 1, we have
q(αt) ≤ αq(t) + q(0) = αq(t).
Divide both side by αt, we can prove that q(t)/t is monoton-
ically non-decreasing. Therefore, q(t+ 1)/(t+ 1) ≥ q(t)/t,
which implies (12).
As a consequence of Lemma 1, we know that fi(tHiu)/t
is monotonically non-decreasing. As a result, there are only
two possibilities:
(i) fi(tHiu)/t is bounded for all i and for all u, which
implies that the limit limt→∞ fi(tHiu)/t exists.
(ii) fi(tHiu)/t is unbounded for some i and u.
The next lemma provides several important properties for
the case where limt→∞ fi(tHiu)/t exists, whose proof is
reported in the appendix:
Lemma 2: If the following limit is well defined, i.e., finite,
for all u ∈ Rn:
lim
t→∞
fi(tHiu)
t
= Ci(u), (13)
then the following statements are true:
(i) Ci(αu) = |α|Ci(u) and Ci(u1 + u2) ≤ Ci(u1) +
Ci(u2).
(ii) Define the function hi(u, v, t) : Rn × Rmi × R 7→ R,
hi(u, v, t) ,
1
t
[fi(v + tHiu)− fi(v)] . (14)
Then the following pointwise limit holds:
lim
t→∞
hi(u, v, t) = Ci(u). (15)
Moreover, the convergence is uniform on any compact
set of (u, v).
(iii) For any v and u, we have that
fi(v +Hiu)− fi(v) ≤ Ci(u). (16)
Remark 3: Intuitively speaking, one can interpret fi as a
potential field and the derivative of fi as the force generated
by sensor i (if it is differentiable). By (16), we know that the
force from the potential field fi along the u direction cannot
exceed Ci(u) (or Ci(u)/‖u‖ to normalize). On the other
hand, Equation (15) implies that this bound is achievable.
We now give the sufficient condition for the robustness of
the estimator.
Theorem 1 (Sufficient condition): If the following condi-
tions hold:
1) Ci(u) is well defined for all u ∈ Rn and all i ∈ S;
2) the following inequality holds for all non-zero u:∑
i∈I
Ci(u) <
∑
i∈Ic
Ci(u), ∀I ∈ C, (17)
then the estimator g is robust.
Proof: Our goal is to prove that there exists a β(z),
such that for any t ≥ β(z), ‖u‖ = 1, a ∈ A, the following
inequality holds:∑
i∈S
fi(yi −Hi × tu) <
∑
i∈S
fi(yi −Hi × (t+ 1)u). (18)
As a result, any point ‖xˆ‖ ≥ β(z)+1 cannot be the solution
of the optimization problem since there exists a better point
(‖xˆ‖−1)xˆ/‖xˆ‖. Therefore, we must have ‖g(y)‖ ≤ β(z)+1
and hence the estimator is robust.
Suppose the set of malicious sensors is I, to prove (18),
we will first look at benign sensors. Due to the uniform
convergence of hi(u, v, t) to Ci(u) on U × {−zi} shown
in Lemma 2, given any δ > 0 we can always find a finite
constant Ni depending on δ and zi such that for all t ≥
Ni(δ, zi), the following inequality holds:
hi(−zi, u, t) =
1
t
[fi(tHiu− zi)− fi(−zi)] ≥ Ci(u)− δ,
(19)
for any ‖u‖ = 1. By (12), we can derive that
fi((t+ 1)Hiu− zi)− fi(tHiu− zi) ≥ Ci(u)− δ. (20)
We define β(z) , max1≤i≤mNi(δ, zi) and fix δ to be
δ =
1
m
min
‖u‖=1
min
I∈C
(∑
i∈Ic
Ci(u)−
∑
i∈I
Ci(u)
)
. (21)
Notice that we write min‖u‖=1 instead of inf‖u‖=1 since
Ci(u) is continuous and the set {u : ‖u‖ = 1} is compact.
Hence, the infimum is achievable, which further proves that
δ > 0 is strictly positive. Hence, for i = 1, . . . ,m, if t >
βδ(z) we have
fi((t+ 1)Hiu− zi)− fi(tHiu− zi)
≥ Ci(u)− δ, ∀‖u‖ = 1. (22)
Since for good sensors, zi = yi, we know that∑
i∈Ic
[fi((t+ 1)Hiu− zi)− fi(tHiu− zi)]
≥
∑
i∈Ic
Ci(u)− (m− p)δ, ∀‖u‖ = 1. (23)
We now consider malicious sensors. By Lemma 2 (iii), we
know that for i ∈ I, and any u∑
i∈I
fi(yi − tHiu)−
∑
i∈I
fi(yi − (t+ 1)Hiu) ≤
∑
i∈I
Ci(−u).
(24)
Hence from (21), (24) and (23), we know that∑
i∈S
fi(yi − (t+ 1)Hiu)−
∑
i∈S
fi(yi − tHiu)
≥
∑
i∈Ic
Ci(u)−
∑
i∈I
Ci(u)− (m− p)δ > 0,
which proves (18).
Remark 4: Assuming that yi is a scalar and w = 0, Fawzi
et al. [16] prove that the state can be exactly recovered under
the integrity attack if and only if for all u 6= 0, there are at
least 2p + 1 non-zero Hiu. Notice that if for some u 6= 0,
there are less than 2p+1 non-zero Hiu, then we can choose I
to contain the largest p Hiu and thus violate (17). As a result,
our sufficient condition is stronger than the ones proposed
in [16]. The main reason is that we seek to use convex
optimization to solve the state estimation problem, while
in [16], a combinatorial optimization problem is needed to
recover the state.
We next give necessary conditions for the robustness of the
estimator.
Theorem 2 (Necessary Condition I): If Ci(u) is well de-
fined for all u ∈ Rn and all i ∈ S but there exist some
‖u0‖ = 1, I0 ∈ C such that∑
i∈I0
Ci(u0) >
∑
i∈Ic
0
Ci(u0), (25)
then the estimator is not robust to the attack.
Proof: The robustness of the estimator is equivalent
to that the optimal estimate xˆ satisfies ‖xˆ‖ ≤ µ(z) for all
a ∈ A, where µ is a real-valued function. To this end, we
will prove that for any r > 0, there exists a y such that all xˆ
that satisfies ‖xˆ‖ ≤ r cannot be the optimal solution of (5).
We will first look at the compromised sensors. For every
δ > 0 we can always find a finite constant Ni(δ) such that
for any xˆ ∈ {xˆ : ‖xˆ‖ ≤ r} and for all t > Ni, the following
inequality holds:
fi(tHiu0 −Hixˆ)− fi(tHiu0 −Hi(xˆ+ u0))
≥fi((t+ 1)Hiu0 −Hi(xˆ+ u0))− fi(tHiu0 −Hi(xˆ + u0))
≥hi(u0,−Hi(xˆ+ u0), t) ≥ Ci(u0)− δ, ∀i ∈ I0. (26)
The first inequality is derived from (12). The second inequal-
ity is due to the uniform convergence of hi(u, v, t) to Ci(u)
on {u0} × {v : v = −Hix+ u0, ‖x‖ ≤ r}.
Let us choose
δ =
1
m

∑
i∈I0
Ci(u0)−
∑
i∈Ic
0
Ci(u0)

 ,
and t = maxi∈I0 Ni(δ) and yi = tHiu0 for all i ∈ I0, then
we know for any ‖xˆ‖ ≤ r,∑
i∈I0
[fi(yi −Hixˆ)− fi(yi −Hi(xˆ+ u0))]
≥
∑
i∈I0
Ci(u0)− pδ.
Now let us look at the benign sensors. By Lemma 2 (iii) we
have
fi(zi −Hi(xˆ+ u0))− fi(zi −Hixˆ)
≤ Ci(u0), ∀i ∈ I
c
0 . (27)
From (26) and (27),∑
i∈S
fi(yi −Hi(xˆ+ u0))−
∑
i∈S
fi(yi −Hixˆ)
≤
∑
i∈Ic
0
Ci(u0)−
∑
i∈I0
Ci(u0) + pδ < 0.
Thus for such a y satisfying
yi =
{
zi, if i ∈ Ic0
tHiu0, if i ∈ I0,
xˆ+u0 is a better estimate than all xˆ satisfying ‖xˆ‖ ≤ r. Since
r is an arbitrary positive real number, we can conclude that
the estimator is not robust.
Before continuing on, we would like to provide some
remarks on the main result. First, it is worth noticing that the
existence of a well defined limit of fi(tHiu)/t is crucial for
the robustness of g. For example, the least squares estimator
cannot be robust since fi is in quadratic form. Using the
potential field and force analogies in Remark 3, one can
interpret the results presented in this section as: the estimator
g is robust if the force generated by any sensor is bounded
and if the combined force of any collection of p sensors is
no greater than the combined force of the remaining m− p
sensors.
Secondly, one can see that the conditions proved in The-
orem 1 and 2 are very tight, with only a trivial gap where
the LHS of (25) equals the RHS.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have studied the robust estimation problem where p out
of m sensors are under attack. The malicious measurements
can be arbitrarily manipulated and thus a robust estimator
which can give a reliable estimate is needed. Our interest is
not to study any concrete estimator in presence of attacks.
Instead, we have considered a general class of estimators
which integrate a large number of important estimators as
special cases and given sufficient and necessary conditions
for the robustness of the estimator. Future works include
the robustness analysis for the dynamical state estimation
problem.
V. APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 2:
(i) If α = 0, then clearly Ci(0) = 0. On the other hand,
if α 6= 0, from the definition in (13), we have
Ci(αu) = lim
t→∞
1
t
fi(|α|tHiu)
= |α| lim
t→∞
1
|α| t
fi(|α|tHiu) = |α|Ci(u).
Due to the scaling property of Ci(u) and the convexity
of fi, we have
Ci(u1 + u2) = 2Ci
(
u1 + u2
2
)
≤ Ci(u1) + Ci(u2).
Therefore, we know that Ci is actually a semi-norm on
Rn
(ii) Based on the convexity of fi, we obtain
2fi(
tHiu
2
) ≤ fi(v + tHiu) + fi(−v), (28)
fi(tHiu) ≥ 2fi(
2v + tHiu
2
)− f(2v). (29)
Dividing both sides of (28) and (29) by t and taking
limit over t, we have
Ci(u) ≤ lim inf
t→∞
1
t
fi(v + tHiu) + lim
t→∞
1
t
fi(−v),
(30)
Ci(u) ≥ lim sup
t→∞
2
t
fi(v +
t
2
Hiu)− lim
t→∞
1
t
fi(2v).
(31)
Since limt→∞ fi(−v)/t = limt→∞ fi(2v)/t = 0, from
(31) and (30) we have the following pointwise limit
lim
t→∞
hi(u, v, t) = Ci(u).
Notice that for a fixed (u, v), by Lemma 1, h(u, v, t)
is monotonically non-decreasing with respect to t. Fur-
thermore, Ci(u) is continuous since it is a semi-norm.
Therefore, by Dini’s theorem [31], h(u, v, t) converges
uniformly to Ci(u) on a compact set of (u, v).
(iii) By the convexity of fi, we have
fi(v + tHiu)− fi(v + (t− 1)Hiu)
≤ fi(v + (t+ 1)Hiu)− fi(v + tHiu),
and
fi(v + (t+ 1)Hiu)− fi(v + tHiu)
≤
1
t
(fi(v + tHiu)− fi(v)).
Then we can conclude that
fi(v +Hiu)− fi(v)
≤ lim
t→∞
1
t
(fi(v + tHiu)− fi(v)) = Ci(u).
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